The Politics of the Rule of Law by Cheema, Moeen H.
  
 
THE POLITICS OF THE RULE OF LAW 
Moeen H. Cheemaכ 
In March 2009, Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry and several other 
deposed judges were restored to the Supreme Court of Pakistan as a 
result of a populist movement for the restoration of an independent 
judiciary. The Supreme Court of Pakistan has since engaged in judicial 
activism that has resulted in a clash between the judiciary and the 
elected executive and has brought the distinction between the Rule of 
Law and the judicialization of politics into contestation. This Paper 
deconstructs the philosophical debates over the meaning and relevance 
of the Rule of Law in order to show that the claims to universal 
applicability, neutrality and inherent value implicit in the dominant 
modes of theorizing about the Rule of Law are hollow. The deeper 
concern animating these debates is not the desire to draw hard lines 
between “law” and “politics.” However, abstract Rule of Law 
contestations have limited value and relevance, when divorced from the 
political, constitutional, and sociological context. Only a sharper 
understanding of the nature of the special politics of law and the specific 
contexts (of constitutional law, state structure, social, and economic life-
forms) shall enable a better understanding of the ever-increasing 
resonance of the Rule of Law, especially in the Global South. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A remarkable sequence of events in Pakistan caught the international 
legal community’s imagination when the deposed Chief Justice of 
Pakistan, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, was reinstated as a result of a 
populist movement led by the country’s lawyers in March 2009.1 This 
“Lawyers’ Movement” began in March 2007 when Justice Chaudhry was 
dismissed from office by the incumbent President and military chief, 
General Pervez Musharraf. The dismissal sparked spontaneous protests 
by the country’s lawyers.2 Images of lawyers clad in their signature black 
and white uniforms, braving barrages of tear gas shells and baton charges 
by the police, emerged as potent symbols of the struggles for the Rule of 
Law and liberal democracy in the Global South.3 In July 2007, an 
  
 1. See Pakistan Reinstates Sacked Judge, BBC (Mar. 16, 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7945294.stm. 
 2. Toby Berkman, The Pakistani Lawyers’ Movement and the Popular Currency 
of Judicial Power, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1705, 1711-1714 (2010). 
 3. See Lawyers Protest Against Musharraf, BBC (Mar. 12, 2007),  
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emboldened Supreme Court restored Justice Chaudhry as the Chief 
Justice of Pakistan.4 However, on November 3, 2007, Pakistan’s military 
ruler declared an unconstitutional state of emergency and dismissed 
nearly sixty judges of the superior courts, including Justice Chaudhry.5 It 
took a sustained movement by the lawyers, opposition political parties, 
and the Chief Justice’s burgeoning supporters amongst the media, civil 
society, and the masses to override the resistance offered not only by the 
military regime, but also that of an elected government whose path 
through the democratic transition had been paved by the Lawyers’ 
Movement. The military regime lost its grip on power in this struggle. 
During the early stage of the movement, the lawyers’ demands were 
couched in strictly legal and constitutional terms. However, as the need 
for broader public support arose, it became increasingly hard to maintain 
a strict separation between the lawyers’ demands of formal 
constitutionalism and the more ambitious aspirations of democracy and 
social justice. The slogan of the Rule of Law began to emerge as the 
repository of expectations that went far beyond the independence of the 
judiciary. Upon the restoration of the Supreme Court to its pre-
emergency composition, the judiciary began to articulate an 
understanding of the Rule of Law shaped through the experience of the 
Lawyers’ Movement. It appeared that the court visualized itself, perhaps 
justifiably, as an institution with considerable democratic credentials and 
the mandate to give effect to the demands that had propelled public 
support for the court’s independence and the judges’ restoration. 
However, the court’s aggressive judicial review actions, in particular, the 
resort to self-styled powers of initiating suo motu proceedings based on 
media reports of corruption, abuse of authority, and human rights 
  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6441133.stm; see also In Pictures: Lawyers’ 
Protest, BBC (Mar. 12, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_pictures/6442747.stm. 
 4. See Chief Justice of Pakistan Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry v. President of 
Pakistan, (2007) PLD 2010 (SC) 61. See generally Mr. Justice Iftikhar Muhammad 
Chaudhry, Chief Justice of Pakistan v. President of Pakistan, (2007) PLD 2007 (SC) 578. 
The detailed judgment, authored nearly two and a half years after the issuance of the 
short order due to the imposition of emergency and the removal of most of the judges 
who sat on the bench, recounts in great detail the events surrounding the first removal of 
the Chief Justice. Id. 
 5. See Berkman, supra note 2, at 1715. 
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violations resulted in charges of judicial overreach.6 Following a 
concerted campaign by the government to push back, the contours of the 
separation of powers, the distinction between the Rule of Law, and 
legitimate democratic politics thus emerged as central and divisive 
debates in the country.  
Can the Supreme Court of Pakistan find a blueprint of the Rule of 
Law in legal and political theory that might enable it to do substantial 
justice to the expectations created by the Lawyers’ Movement while 
avoiding the fallout of political contestability? Can we have recourse to 
established theories of the Rule of Law in order to find meaningful 
guidance on how to create an institutional balance of powers and 
incontrovertible distinctions between law, politics and policy in 
Pakistan? After all, it is precisely for cases such as Pakistan that 
universal and abstract theories of the Rule of Law are offered as vital 
cures. An entire global industry has developed for the implantation 
and/or promotion of the Rule of Law in such “under-
developed” jurisdictions.7 If the dominant theories of the Rule of Law are 
not relevant to Pakistan then their claims to universality, and the utility 
of Rule of Law interventions based on such theoretical foundations, must 
be questioned. An exploration of theoretical literature on the Rule of Law 
undertaken in this Paper reveals that such claims to universal 
applicability, neutrality and inherent value that are implicit in the 
dominant modes of theorizing about the meaning of the Rule of Law are 
indeed hollow. This is because the philosophical debates on the meaning, 
content and value of the Rule of Law anywhere are driven by the same 
tensions between law and politics, between the legitimacy of the judicial 
role and democratic politics that Pakistan’s Supreme Court faces. The 
theoretical discourses on the Rule of Law, while undertaken in abstract 
and apolitical language, are in a deeper sense, arguments for specific 
constitutional and/or political structures that claim neutrality but are 
  
 6. See generally Moeen Cheema, The Chaudhry Court: ‘Rule of Law’ or 
‘Judicialization of Politics’? in THE POLITICS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF THE CHAUDHRY 
COURT 2005-2013 (Moeen Cheema & Ijaz Gilani eds., 2015). 
 7. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Dark Side of the Relationship Between the Rule 
of Law and Liberalism, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 516, 516 (2008). 
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essentially prejudiced towards the very conclusions that are sought from 
such supposedly neutral accounts.  
As such, Pakistan is a central case which highlights that the rhetorical 
power of the Rule of Law and its value as a “political” ideal must be 
found in concrete contestations over the structures of the legal system 
and their contexts in the state and society. This argument will be 
advanced in two stages. The first half of the Paper will attempt to 
deconstruct the dominant debates on the Rule of Law as a struggle over 
the boundaries between law and politics. The second half of the Paper 
will then seek to reconstruct these very debates as extensions of 
particular commitments over constitutional and administrative structures, 
including an appropriate role of the judiciary. In addition to these state-
centric contexts, another significant context to Rule of Law contestations 
will be unveiled: the complex, often deeply polarized and thoroughly 
politicized context of the society within which various understandings of 
the Rule of Law take shape. The difficulties inherent in abstract 
conceptualizations of the Rule of Law will be made evident when 
transplanted to the vastly different social environments in the Global 
South. Lastly, it will be argued as a tentative conclusion that an entirely 
new mode of theorizing the Rule of Law is demanded, which makes 
recourse to its specific socio-political and economic contexts.  
I. A TOPOGRAPHY OF THE TERRAIN OF CONTESTATIONS 
The resonance of the rhetoric of the Rule of Law in Pakistan is not a 
unique or isolated phenomenon. The Rule of Law is increasingly being 
recognized as a universal value or a “global ideal.”8 There is a near-
universal “agreement, traversing all fault lines, on one point, and one 
point alone: that the ‘rule of law’ is good for everyone.”9 And yet, the 
Rule of Law is simultaneously described as an “exceedingly elusive 
notion”10 and “an essentially contested concept”11: it connotes so many 
  
 8. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 
3 (2004). 
 9. Id. at 1. 
 10. Id. at 3. 
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different things to different people that we may say that the disagreement 
about its meaning “extends to its core.”12 However, the situation is not 
hopeless as there is only a relatively short list of plausible conceptions. 
Brian Z. Tamanaha charts a typology of theories of Rule of Law in a 
survey of the literature and finds that the various competing conceptions 
of the Rule of Law can be divided into distinct “formal” and 
“substantive” versions.13 There are three shades of each kind of theory 
forming a continuum or a “progression that runs from thinner to thicker 
accounts” or “moving from formulations with fewer requirements to 
more requirements” (see Table 1).14  
 
Thinner ------------------------- Thicker ------------------------- Thickest 
Rule-by-
Law 
Formal 
Legality 
Democratic 
Legality 
Individual 
Rights 
Right of 
Dignity 
and/or 
Justice 
Socio-
economic 
Rights 
Table 1: Graphic based on Brian Tamanaha’s “Alternative Rule of Law Formulations”15 
  
The thinnest version of Rule of Law in the above graphic, 
characterized more aptly as “Rule by Law,” is the bare notion of 
governance according to law.16 While Tamanaha considers it to be “an 
empty tautology,”17 governance by law is the minimum necessary 
condition of the Rule of Law. Nonetheless, this minimalist sense of Rule 
of Law is meaningless when tyrannical or dictatorial regimes retain the 
power to declare what the law is and alter it at their convenience. The 
second, more robust, version of formal Rule of Law is that based upon 
  
 11. Randall Peerenboom, Varieties of Rule of Law: An Introduction and 
Provisional Conclusion 1 (Asian Discourses of Rule of Law, Working Paper No. 03-16, 
2004); see also Leighton McDonald, The Rule of Law in the ‘New Regulatory State’, 33 
COMM. L. WORLD REV. 197, 203-08 (2004).  
 12. TAMANAHA, supra note 8, at 3. 
 13. Id. at 91-113. 
 14. Id. at 91.  
 15. Id.  
 16. Id. at 91-93. 
 17. Id. at 92 (quoting Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE 
AUTHORITY OF LAW 210, 212-13 (1979) [hereinafter The Rule of Law and Its Virtue]).  
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the principles of “legality.”18 This conception of Rule of Law gained 
prominence with its elaboration by Lon Fuller as a kind of procedural 
natural law or “inner morality of law” that enumerated desired qualities 
in law.19 Fuller even argued that a legal system would not really exist if, 
as in most of the time, these principles of legality were grossly violated.20 
Fuller’s desiderata included generality, clarity, public promulgation, 
temporal stability, substantive consistency, absence of retroactive 
application, a substantial degree of adherence by officials and subjects, 
and the reasonable possibility of compliance by the subjects with the 
promulgated rules.21 Joseph Raz added to an avowedly “incomplete” list 
the requirements of the independence of the judiciary, principles of 
natural justice, judicial review, access to justice, and limits on the 
discretion of crime preventing agencies.22 Robert Summers appended 
further layers of essentials including the existence of rule-making bodies, 
independent tribunals and other redress mechanisms, civic education of 
citizens, an independent legal profession, and legal academia.23 The 
forms and processes of modern Western legal systems and their 
underlying policies (or their “axiological core”)24 accordingly emerge as 
the existing ideal of formal legality.25 This brand of formal, or rather 
procedural, legality has thus evolved into an articulation of faith in the 
structures and processes of modern Western legal systems as they have 
come to exist, of course with room for reforms at the margins.26 
  
 18. See generally LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (2d ed. 1969). 
 19. Id. at 42-46. 
 20. Id. at 39. 
 21. Id. at 33-44. 
 22. Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, 93 L. Q. REV. 195, 200-202 
(1977). 
 23. See Robert S. Summers, A Formal Theory of the Rule of Law, 6 RATIO JURIS 
127, 129-30 (1993). 
 24. Id. at 131. 
 25. For an elaboration of the systemic nature of his formal Rule of Law theory, 
see generally Robert S. Summers, The Principles of the Rule of Law, 74 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1691, 1691 (1999).  
 26. However, while the existence of the structures of a modern legal system are 
integral to this view, the specific shapes and forms of legal mechanisms and processes, 
and “the institutional and cultural struts supporting the [R]ule of [L]aw are recognized by 
most as being empirically contingent.” Leighton McDonald, Positivism and the Formal 
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The third version of formal theory incorporates the prerequisite of 
democracy. It is democracy which imbues legal rules and processes with 
legitimacy in pluralistic polities where disagreement on fundamental 
values is pervasive.27 This brand of formal Rule of Law then not only 
requires the conformity of governmental action to a valid law but also 
requires such law itself to be democratically legitimate. For Habermas, 
“legitimate” law in this “proceduralist paradigm” is the residual cement 
of society: “if all other mechanisms of social integration are exhausted, 
law yet provides some means for keeping together complex and 
centrifugal societies that otherwise would fall into pieces.”28 Sunstein 
advances the idea of “incompletely theorized agreements” to explicate 
how law functions in liberal societies to develop a core of agreement 
about the mechanisms, processes, and principles for the resolution of 
disputes amongst myriad and even fundamental disagreements about 
values.29 The relationship between law and democracy is that of mutual 
reinforcement: law derives its legitimacy from democratic processes; 
democratic processes may in turn derive their legitimacy from widely 
accepted rules for structuring politics and for dispute resolution 
mechanisms, which law provides.  
Substantive theories of Rule of Law incorporate the idea of rights or 
various “content specifications” to the elements of formal legality.30 The 
thinnest substantive version is one that incorporates individual rights 
  
Rule of Law: Questioning the Connection, 26 AUSTL. J. LEG. PHIL. 93, 105 (2001) 
[hereinafter Positivism and the Formal Rule of Law]. Judicial review of executive action, 
for example, is one such strut contingent on the legal culture of the specific jurisdiction 
under study. Id. at 106. See also Timothy Endicott, The Impossibility of the Rule of Law, 
19 O.J.L.S. 1, 10 (1999). 
 27. By some accounts the right to democratic governance is in itself a 
fundamental right. See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic 
Governance, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 46, 46 (1992). 
 28. Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: An Author’s Reflections, 76 
DENV. U. L. REV. 937, 942 (1999). See generally Kaarlo Tuori, Discourse Ethics and the 
Legitimacy of Law, 2 RATIO JURIS 125, 128-131 (1989); Jürgen Habermas, Towards a 
Communication-Concept of Rational Collective Will-Formation. A Thought Experiment, 
2 RATIO JURIS 144, 144 (1989). 
 29. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 
HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1735-36 (1995). 
 30. TAMANAHA, supra note 8, at 102. 
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such as the rights to property, contract, privacy, autonomy, etc. into the 
concept of democratic legality.31 The second substantive brand of Rule of 
Law adds civil and political rights, rendering this theory even thicker.32 
The thickest substantive version includes socio-economic or social 
welfare rights in addition to individual and political rights.33 The three 
shades of substantive theory correspond to the three generations of 
fundamental or human rights. Such are the contours of the Rule of Law 
terrain. “While formal legality is the dominant understanding of rule of 
law among legal theorists,” the thinnest substantive version “likely 
approximates the common sense of the rule of law within Western 
societies (assuming a common understanding exists).”34 Tamanaha 
argues that the thickest version of Rule of Law theory, in contrast, is 
overburdened and “throws up severe difficulties” and, though tempting, 
“should not be indulged” for it would render the Rule of Law a “proxy 
battleground for disputes about broader social issues.”35 Thus, we are 
essentially left with a choice between two credible versions of formal 
legality and two reasonable theories of substantive Rule of Law (see 
Table 2).  
 
Formal Legality Democratic Legality 
Individual 
Rights 
Individual and 
Political Rights 
   Table 2: Graphic based on Brian Tamanaha’s “Alternative Rule of Law Formulations36 
The above graphic clarifies at least the range of possibilities, and 
perhaps, we may begin to discern what the various debates are really 
about. Note, however, that the linear progression—from formal legality 
to inclusion of democracy to protection of individual rights to the 
incorporation of civil and political rights—thus appears to coincide with 
  
 31. Id. at 102. 
 32. Id. at 109. 
 33. Id. at 112-13. 
 34. Id. at 111. 
 35. Id. at 113. 
 36. TAMANAHA, supra note 8, at 91. See also Table 1, supra note 15. 
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the development of Western political-legal thought. However, the Rule 
of Law is not presented as a product exclusively of Western thinking, but 
rather as a universal ideal that is at the heart of the Law and 
Development movement the world over. 
II. DECONSTRUCTING THE RULE OF LAW DISCOURSES 
A. Formal versus Substantive Rule of Law: The Haunting Spectre 
of the Politics of Law? 
The classification of formal and substantive theories raises some 
pertinent questions. Are there philosophical or pragmatic criteria on 
which these distinctions may meaningfully be drawn? What are the bases 
for recommending one kind of theory in preference to another? These 
questions may be better addressed by visualizing the relationship 
between the various theories of Rule of Law in a different way: in the 
form of concentric circles rather than along a linear spectrum (see Table 
3).37  
 
  
 37. See Peerenboom, supra note 11, at 5-6. 
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Table 3: Graphic based on author’s reconceptualization of the Rule of Law38 
 
The advantage of this formulation is arguably that it enables a better 
appreciation of the fact that the core of Rule of Law theory is provided 
by formal legality and that Rule of Law includes at least that.39 The 
debate then is about what else it includes, if anything at all. Another 
advantage is that we can see what lies beyond the Rule of Law and what 
is definitely not part of any reasonable formulation of this political ideal: 
the realm of pure politics as well as of culture, tradition, religion, and 
other sources of norms for socio-political and economic regulation.40 
This helps us better understand the true nature of the choice between the 
various formal and substantive theories. The further one retreats inwards 
  
 38. See generally id. 
 39. See McDonald, supra note 11, at 205. 
 40. See Peerenboom, supra note 11, at 6. 
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from the thickest version bordering the realm beyond, the less politically-
contested the theory of Rule of Law appears to be. 
It is in terms of a concern with the seepage of politics into law that the 
debate between formal and substantive versions of the Rule of Law may 
then be understood. The formalists fear that the incorporation of 
politically-contested notions such as the various kinds of rights may 
overburden the concept and hence render it devoid of any independent 
value. Paul Craig, for example, concludes that “the adoption of a fully 
substantive conception of the rule of law has the consequence of robbing 
the concept of any function which is independent of the theory of justice 
which imbues such an account of law.”41 A key passage by Raz is 
frequently quoted as the quintessential representation of this point of 
view:  
If the rule of law is the rule of the good law then to explain its nature is 
to propound a complete social philosophy. But if so the term lacks any 
useful function. We have no need to be converted to the [R]ule of 
[L]aw just in order to discover that to believe in it is to believe that 
good should triumph. . . . It is also to be insisted that the [R]ule of 
[L]aw . . . . is not to be confused with democracy, justice, equality 
(before the law or otherwise), human rights of any kind or respect for 
persons or for the dignity of man.42 
It is not immediately clear, however, in what sense the substantive 
versions threaten to rob the Rule of Law of any independent function. 
What, after all, is the ‘function’ of Rule of Law, or rather of theorizing 
over its meanings? One argument, that Raz seems to espouse, is that the 
over-arching purpose of theorizing the meaning of the Rule of Law is to 
attain analytical clarity. In this ‘philosophical’ mode of theorizing, 
conceptual neatness is a worthy end as it may enable the articulation of 
diverse demands in multiple vocabularies—of Rule of Law, justice, 
rights, constitutionalism, etc.—so that all of the various justifications of 
these demands may be better investigated and distinctly evaluated. 
  
 41. Paul Craig, Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An 
Analytical Framework, 1997 PUB. L. 466, 487. 
 42. Raz, supra note 22, at 196. 
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However, this philosophical approach presents a number of problems. 
The first is a methodological one. The Rule of Law is not just a 
theoretical construct but rather a real world or social phenomenon.43 
Different people attach different meanings and demands to the Rule of 
Law not just in theoretical discourses but also in contested political 
debates.44 As such, it is questionable whether a theoretical account laying 
out the “essential” characteristics of the Rule of Law that does not fit 
with political practices and rhetorical usages has much value.  
Summers perceived this methodological difficulty inherent in 
philosophically conceptualizing the Rule of Law. In support of his 
insistence on conceptual clarity he argued that the Rule of Law would 
lose traction, mass appeal, and ability to obtain compliance from officials 
or allegiance from citizens if its meanings become contested or obscure: 
A major explanation for the uncertain advance of the rule of law in the 
world and for relapses even where it has generally prevailed, is that the 
requisites of its implementation and the values it serves are not 
sufficiently well understood. The capacity of any ideal to be realized 
within a society depends on how far social attitudes are well focused in 
its support, and on whether its clientele within the society are duly 
organized behind it.45  
However, the assumption that ordinary citizens or the specific clientele 
(practitioners, judges, academics and students) will rally in support of 
Rule of Law only if it is conceptually neat is problematic. There are 
several historical examples, including that of Pakistan, where social and 
  
 43. For the methodological difficulties inherent in philosophical approaches to 
legal theory, see generally D.J. Galligan, Legal Theory and Empirical Research, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 976 (Peter Cane & Herbert Kritzer 
eds., 2012). 
 44. Perhaps that is not such a bad thing after all if the Rule of Law is essentially, 
and not just endlessly, contested. See Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially 
Contested Concept (In Florida)?, 21 L. & PHIL. 137, 151 (2002). A very important 
consequence of the essential contestedness of the Rule of Law being a “marked raising of 
the level of quality of arguments in the disputes of the contestant parties.” W. B. Gallie, 
Essentially Contested Concepts, in 56 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 167, 
193 (1956). 
 45. Summers, supra note 23, at 128. 
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political movements have been built around ideas and aspirations that do 
not satisfy the exactitude of political and social theorists.46 Thus, the 
hope that conceptual clarity will lead to popular backing for Rule of Law 
may be an empty justification for a theorist’s obsession with tidiness 
rather than a valid sociological supposition.  
Another question must then arise: who is the audience of Rule of Law 
discourse? When theorists talk of the Rule of Law, who are they trying to 
convince? Is Rule of Law talk designed to rally public support (or focus 
“social attitudes” in Summer’s terms) behind the precepts advocated by 
particular versions of legality? Or, is the Rule of Law’s special 
“clientele” within society (the participants in the legal enterprise) the 
target audience? Allegiance to formal theory may reinforce the Rule of 
Law if a bulk of the lawyers, judges, academics, and others involved in 
the business of law converge on a settled narrow meaning of the concept. 
However, such clarity, and such loyalty, may not be an unquestionable 
good particularly if the popular understandings of the meaning of the 
Rule of Law diverge substantially from the clear, precise, and apolitical 
definitions that formal theorists advocate. We may legitimately entertain 
the fears that the society which tolerated the emergence of such hyper-
professionalized and insular discourses on the meanings of the Rule of 
Law “might be deplorably sheeplike” and the “sheep might end in the 
slaughter-house”47: 
Those who make and can recognize enacted law may use that capacity 
and that specialist knowledge for their own benefit, and to the 
detriment of the rest, who find they know less and less about the 
detailed basis on which their society is organized. The specialization of 
normative authority may thus exacerbate whatever exploitation and 
hierarchy exist in a given society apart from its legalization.48 
If formal Rule of Law theory were to dominate the legal discourse, 
especially in university classrooms, we may end up with a situation 
  
 46. In South Asia for example, the reasons for the traction and mass appeal of 
political ideals demand a deeper scrutiny. See AYESHA JALAL, DEMOCRACY AND 
AUTHORITARIANISM IN SOUTH ASIA 66-67 (1995).  
 47. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 117 (1994). 
 48. Jeremy Waldron, All We Like Sheep, 12 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 169, 181 (1999). 
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where decades down the path powerful legal actors, especially judges 
and seasoned lawyers, are constantly being asked to enforce populist and 
more substantive understandings of the Rule of Law only to find 
themselves incapable of accommodating those demands. Law may then 
become a deeply conservative force in that society, exercising 
considerable normative and institutional drags on movements for social 
change, on account of its failure to take up new interests and 
expectations that it could logically and meaningfully incorporate. 
Perhaps this situation already exists in most jurisdictions. 
B. Rule of Law versus Instrumentalism: Rule of Law as Means to 
Ends? 
The hopes for constructing a conceptually neat and de-politicized 
account of formal legality are further complicated by concerns that 
politics is not only brought to the frontiers of formal theory by the 
substantive rights-bearing accounts, but permeates all the way to its very 
core. Such is the outcome of another historical debate over the value of 
the Rule of Law: whether formal legality has intrinsic value or is it 
merely means to (political, social and economic) ends? Tamanaha has 
highlighted a more recent form of this debate, the tension between “two 
core ideas”: (1) “the classical rule of law ideal that there are independent 
legal limits on law itself” and (2) “legal instrumentalism, . . . that law 
(and hence the Rule of Law) is a means to an end or an instrument for the 
social good.”49 The thinner (formal) conceptions appear to be associated 
with the core liberal idea that the Rule of Law secures the liberty of 
individual citizens through the restraint of arbitrary governmental 
power.50 The formalists disavow the instrumental usage of Rule of Law 
for broader socio-political and economic agendas and resist calls for 
these to be incorporated in the very notion of the Rule of Law for fear 
that it may overburden the concept, as discussed in the previous section.51 
  
 49. See Brian Z. Tamanah, How an Instrumental View of Law Corrodes the Rule 
of Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 469, 469-70 (2007). 
 50. For an elaboration of the liberal conception of the Rule of Law, see Jeremy 
Waldron, The Rule of Law in Contemporary Liberal Theory, 2 RATIO JURIS 79 (1989). 
 51. See Part II.A. 
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The thicker theories of Rule of Law appear, in contrast, to be concerned 
primarily with its utility for redistributions of political, social, and 
increasingly economic, power. From the perspective of substantive 
accounts, the Rule of Law is meaningful only because, and to the extent 
that, it helps secure such ends. 
The formalist argument for incontestable value inherent in formal 
legality was advanced most forcefully by Fuller who argued that formal 
legality invariably imposes such meaningful restrictions on oppressive 
regimes that, presumably, they would rather achieve their tyrannical 
goals through administrative rather than legal means.52 For Fuller, the 
failure of the Nazi regime to even minimally adhere to the basic 
requirement of formal legality was prima facie evidence of the 
constraints inherent in formal legality.53 There appears to be some 
internal disagreement amongst proponents of formal legality on this 
point. For Hart, however, the Rule of Law, defined as the fusion of the 
principles of legality and the principles of natural justice,54 is nothing 
more than a set of “principles of good legal craftsmanship” or merely 
principles of the inner efficiency of law that lacks any inherent value or 
morality.55 Likewise for Raz, formal legality is essentially a set of 
principles of the inner efficiency of law that lacks any inherent value or 
morality. The higher a legal system sits on a formal legality index, the 
more efficient that legal system is in achieving whatever aims are 
assigned to law in that polity. Formal legality is thus essentially a 
negative value: “conformity to it does not cause good except through 
  
 52. FULLER, supra note 18, at 41-44; see also Noel B. Reynolds, Grounding the 
Rule of Law, 2 RATIO JURIS 1, 12 (1989). 
 53. See Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor 
Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 652 (1957). Fuller was arguably on a weaker footing as he 
was drawn into a debate with H.L.A. Hart over the strict separation of law and morals on 
the wrong terms. See id. Fuller was thus compelled to argue that formal legality was the 
inner morality of law and, hence, necessarily moral. See id. 
 54. H.L.A. Hart, Problems of Philosophy of Law, in 6 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY 273-74 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967). 
 55. Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1286 (1965) 
(book review). See also Leslie Green, The Concept of Law Revisited, 94 MICH. L. REV. 
1687, 1710-11 (1996). For a description of Hart’s position, see Jeremy Waldron, 
Positivism and Legality: Hart’s Equivocal Response to Fuller, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1135 
(2008). See also Raz, supra note 22, at 208. 
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avoiding evil and the evil which is avoided is evil which could only have 
been caused by the law itself.”56 As such, formal legality is compatible 
with many forms of injustice.57 Therefore, the most that can be said for 
formal legality is that it is morally ambiguous or ambivalent.58 
Nonetheless, even formalists, such as Raz, contend that formal 
legality achieves the valuable social goal of ensuring a minimal level of 
liberty by constraining the exercise of governmental powers. Firstly, it is 
argued that formal legality speaks to the governors and places a demand 
that “government shall be ruled by the law and subject to it.”59 Secondly, 
formal legality speaks to the governed and promises that, regardless of 
the content of laws, they will have notice of governmental designs, and 
hence, a limited ability to plan their actions amounting to a certain 
degree of freedom.60 However, it is recognized that it is a limited form of 
“personal freedom” that does not equate to “political freedom” as 
normally understood.61 Formal legality may also enhance the autonomy 
of the subjects and “provides the foundation for the legal respect for 
human dignity.”62 These are all valuable liberal ends. 
Nonetheless, an even stronger charge may be laid against the formal 
concept of the Rule of Law: that it is not merely a set of morally neutral 
principles of efficiency despite which law may be abused by the rulers, 
but instead that formal legality itself contains the potential for far-
reaching, systemic abuse and is particularly amenable to such misuse. 
After all, as Hart alluded, “general rules clearly framed and publicly 
promulgated are the most efficient form of social control[,]”63 and so 
long as Rule of Law contains no conception of how law is to be used 
(which conceptions have been relegated to the status of ‘external 
morality’ by formal theory), the internal efficiency of law makes it 
particularly useful for authoritarian social control. This intuition is 
  
 56. Raz, supra note 22, at 206. 
 57. The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, supra note 17, at 211. 
 58. See Waldron, supra note 55, at 1162-63. 
 59. Raz, supra note 22, at 196. 
 60. Id. at 204. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 205. 
 63. H. L. A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 115 (1983). 
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validated by the reality of ‘legal’ repression around the world. For 
example, unlike the Nazi regime, which had little patience for oppression 
through law, colonial rule in India demonstrated the ‘value’ of law, for 
the rulers, in enacting more subtly coercive and disciplinary regimes.64  
It may be argued in defense of formal theories that the ideal of the 
Rule of Law “can only be given a contingent, as opposed to necessary, 
value.”65 Further, it is argued that “[the Rule of Law] is a necessary 
condition for justice or democracy[,]” but “this claim is simply not the 
same as claiming that compliance with the rule of law necessarily 
promotes justice or democracy.”66 It may also be argued that the ideal is 
a “partial” one and its inner morality is contingent on the external 
morality in whose support it is wielded.67 One such overarching telos of 
formal legality is the restraint of arbitrary exercise of power.68 Arguably, 
this is a rather uncontroversial basis for justifying the Rule of Law and 
curbing arbitrary power is an incontestable good. E. P. Thompson’s oft-
quoted statement, which scandalized fellow Marxists and other leftist 
critics of formal legality, evidences the emerging consensus on this one 
point: that “the imposing of effective inhibitions upon power and the 
defen[s]e of the citizen from power’s all-intrusive claims, seems . . . to 
be an unqualified human good.”69  
Even if it is acknowledged, however, that formal legality is an 
unqualified human good if, and to the extent that, it imposes meaningful 
limitations on the exercise of arbitrary power, what is the basis for 
restricting the telos to such restraint of governmental power? More 
significantly, what is the basis for excluding other equally valid aims, 
such as, the protection of rights particularly if it is manifest that state 
power will not be meaningfully challenged or constrained until such time 
as civil and political rights are safeguarded, and opportunities for 
  
 64. See generally NASSER HUSSAIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF EMERGENCY: 
COLONIALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW (2003). 
 65. Positivism and the Formal Rule of Law, supra note 26, at 103. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 104. 
 68. Martin Krygier, Ethical Positivism and the Liberalism of Fear, 24 AUSTL. J. 
LEGAL PHIL. 65, 66-75 (1999). 
 69. E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 266 
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democratic participation are made accessible and meaningful? It is 
difficult to find convincing philosophical arguments, which may defend 
formal theories from the demands of substantive conceptions of the Rule 
of Law that also seek to advance the core liberal aims of enhancing the 
autonomy of the citizen and safeguarding basic liberties from the state’s 
intrusion. This is more so the case when certain beliefs in fundamental or 
human rights come to be so widely shared that we may refer to them as 
the ‘public morality’ of (at least a majority) of the republic. It is on these 
terms that we can explain the increasing salience of substantive theories 
of the Rule of Law in the Anglo-American Common Law tradition, such 
as those advanced by T.R.S. Allan and Ronald Dworkin.70 For the latter, 
the Rule of Law is “the ideal of rule by an accurate public conception of 
individual rights.”71 
Nonetheless, substantive theories of the Rule of Law suffer from the 
same critique which has been made of formal legality when they acquire 
universalist pretensions and claim to have descriptive and prescriptive 
potential far beyond the specific constitutional and political climes in 
which they are rooted. Such substantive theories, which rely on abstract 
and universalist conceptions of human rights, must also answer to the 
charge of arbitrarily confining the ends of the Rule of Law. Leaving 
aside general critiques of rights and their usage such as those made by 
  
 70. T.R.S. Allan, for example, has formulated his theory of Rule of Law with 
specific reference to the practice of UK courts. See T.R.S. Allan, LAW, LIBERTY, AND 
JUSTICE: THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH CONSTITUTIONALISM 20-47 (Clarendon 
Press Oxford 1993). 
 71. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 11-12 (1985). Even Raz 
begins to sound eerily like Dworkin when he addressed judicial role in the specific 
constitutional context of the UK: 
In insisting that judicial decisions should be not only faithful but also 
principled, I am suggesting that the function of the Rule of Law is to 
facilitate the integration of particular pieces of legislation with the 
underlying doctrines of the legal system . . . A particular [legislation] . . . 
should be applied in a manner which is both faithful to the legislative 
purpose and principled in integrating it with traditional doctrines of the 
liberties of the citizen. 
Craig, supra note 41, at 484 (citing Joseph Raz, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, ESSAYS 
ON THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 375 (1994)). 
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communitarians and critical legal scholars72—an extensive subject in its 
own right—we may highlight one specific aspect: the privileging of 
individual and political rights over socio-economic rights. In an 
influential work from within the liberal tradition, Amartya Sen has made 
a compelling argument that human freedom depends as much on “social 
and economic arrangements (for example, facilities for education and 
health care) as well as political and civil rights.”73 Sen thus argues that 
five distinct kinds of rights—political freedoms, economic facilities, 
social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective security—
are deeply interconnected and integral to both human freedom and 
economic development.74 As such, substantive conceptions of the Rule of 
Law, which privilege some of these sets of rights (individual and 
political rights) over others (economic and social opportunities), are 
drawing lines in the sand as much as formal conceptions. Therefore, to 
the extent that both formal and substantive conceptions arbitrarily limit 
the ends which the Rule of Law may serve, they become arguments for 
maintaining status quo particularly in societies where law is relatively 
efficient.75 
C. The Impossibility of the Rule of Law?: Liberal Ideology and 
the Indeterminacy of Law 
The critics of formal legality can generally be classified in two 
distinct camps. Those who espouse thicker theories of Rule of Law take 
the stance that Rule of Law has relevance and value as a politico-legal 
  
 72. See generally, e.g., Michael J. Sandel, The Political Theory of the Procedural 
Republic, in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY (Allan Hutchinson & Patrick 
Monahan eds., 1987); MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF 
POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991); Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal 
Studies, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 178, 178 (Janet Halley & Wendy Brown eds., 
2002). 
 73. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 3 (2000). 
 74. Id. at 10. 
 75. See PHILIP SELZNICK, THE MORAL COMMONWEALTH 437 (1992). For another 
canonical statement on the limitations of formal legality and formal equality, see Morton 
J. Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good?, 86 YALE L. J. 561, 566 
(1977) (book review). 
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discourse because it incorporates rights, conceptions, and other political 
ends. The contest is over the meaning of Rule of Law. Another kind of 
challenge has come from the radical left, most notably Critical Legal 
Scholars in the U.S.A., who have accepted the formalist definition of 
Rule of Law but have then denounced it for there is, according to them, 
always an ideology and an agenda (of a liberal ilk) behind formal legality 
that remains unarticulated. As such, (formal) Rule of Law is seen as a 
mask for power and an attempt at legitimating the existing imbalances in 
society.76  
Roberto Unger, for example, argues that the problems inherent in 
formal Rule of Law can be traced to the liberal politics in which it is 
embedded.77 The paradox of liberalism is that while it strengthens the 
demand for equality, the attendant skepticism of state authority 
simultaneously disables challenges to existing social inequalities.78 
Formal legality, characterized by “its commitment to generality and 
autonomy” and “defined by the interrelated notions of neutrality, 
uniformity, and predictability” exacerbates the paradox of liberalism by 
masking the power imbalances existing in society and by making the 
exercise of power appear impersonal.79 It achieves this because of two 
faulty assumptions. First, it is assumed that the most significant power 
rests in the government. This results in an undue focus on the exercise of 
public power and limited attention to private orderings which “affect 
most directly and deeply the individual’s situation. . . . These inequalities 
are neither undone nor effectively redressed by the commitment to 
formal equality before the law.”80 Rather, a commitment to formal 
legality becomes an argument against state interventions designed to 
redress these substantive inequalities.  
The second foundational assumption of formal equality “is that power 
can be constrained by rules.”81 This second “critical premise . . . that 
  
 76. See Peerenboom, supra note 11, at 36. 
 77. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 166-181, 
192-223 (Macmillan ed., 1976). 
 78. Id. at 173-75. 
 79. Id. at 176. 
 80. Id. at 179-180. 
 81. Id. at 179. 
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rules can make power impersonal and impartial—is just as shaky” as the 
first assumption that power resides primarily in the state and hence the 
state ought to be the focus of concerns with the unequal and tyrannical 
exercise of power.82 For Unger and other critical scholars, formality is 
impossible as rules neither dictate outcomes independent of purposes and 
values nor do they significantly constrain the discretion inherent in 
legislative, administrative, and judicial functions. As such, the Critical 
Legal Studies movement embroiled the formal conception of Rule of 
Law in bigger battles over the value of liberalism as a political 
philosophy and the nature of law. With sustained assaults on atomistic 
liberalism and critiques of the inherent indeterminacy of law, the Rule of 
Law became politicized and contested to its formal core.83 The sustained 
assault from the Left undermined the claim that law, especially public 
law adjudication, could be separated from politics and could be 
undertaken in a largely formal manner. More significantly, critical 
scholars opened up even private law to unprecedented scrutiny and 
sought to identify the deep politicization of law and adjudication.84  
The CLS critique of the indeterminacy of law undermined formal 
theory to the extent that the formalists claim that the Rule of Law is the 
rule of rules.85 The critique is essentially based on four broad arguments. 
First, rules are framed in language and cannot fully determine outcomes 
since language itself is indeterminate. Second, rules cannot be given any 
concrete meanings in specific cases until and unless the purposes behind 
the rules are determined. Since the rules themselves often do not 
incorporate a definitive indication of the underlying purpose(s) or 
policy(ies), the process of interpreting and applying rules invariably 
involves discretion and policy choices. Third, the legal system often 
incorporates rules that may justify multiple outcomes at the same time 
with the result that “legal” justifications can often be found for different 
  
 82. Id. at 180. 
 83. See generally Sandel, supra note 72, at 57-61; Duncan Kennedy, Form and 
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1685 (1976). 
 84. See generally Kennedy, supra note 72. 
 85. See Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 
781, 792 (1989); see also Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 1997 YALE L. J. 509, 510 
(1988). 
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and even conflicting positions.86 Fourth, the legal system is not 
composed exclusively of rules but also of broader and vaguer standards 
and principles which do not, and cannot apply, in an either-or fashion. 
Standards and principles may, and often do, conflict with other standards 
and principles, or even with rules, with the result that adjudication 
demands a balancing of various competing considerations. The balancing 
of these competing principles, standards and rules involves 
considerations that are external to law. 
Evaluating the CLS critique of formalism generally, and formal Rule 
of Law specifically, it has been argued that mainstream or centrist legal 
theory has withstood the assault with a degree of equanimity.87 It has also 
been contended that the indeterminacy critique, though substantially 
valid, was overdone and that while indeterminacy does exist in the legal 
system, it is neither as endemic nor as radical as alleged.88 In the vast 
majority of cases, the potential or actual litigants, their lawyers, and the 
judges can confidently assert what rule-dictated outcome will be reached. 
Most of these cases are never litigated, are settled at an early stage, or are 
resolved with relative ease at the lower judicial rungs.89 Radical 
indeterminacy thus appears to be a characteristic of the hardest of hard 
cases that are litigated in the appellate courts, and which are miniscule in 
number relative to the sum total of the applications of legal rules. As 
  
 86. The CLS critique builds upon the earlier work of the Realists. See generally 
Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Realism, 87 TEX. L. REV. 731 (2008). Karl 
Llewellyn, for example, famously argued that for most rules of statutory interpretation, 
there are counter-rules that may enable judges to justify contrary arguments. See Karl 
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Cannons about 
How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 396-99 (1950). Likewise, Julius 
Stone argued that judges in subsequent cases had considerable scope to (re-)interpret the 
ratio decidendi of precedent cases given the options in identifying material facts and 
stating them at multiple levels of generality. See Julius Stone, The Ratio of the Ratio 
Decidendi, 22 MODERN L. REV. 597, 599 (1959). 
 87. See ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE 90-
103 (1993). 
 88. See L.B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 
U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 473 (1987) (distinguishing between indeterminacy and 
underdeterminacy); see also Peter Ingram, Maintaining the Rule of Law, 35 THE PHIL. Q. 
359, 373 (1985). 
 89. See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 411 (1985). 
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such, it is deemed possible to reconstruct the Rule of Law after the 
deconstruction of the CLS in a manner which incorporates aspects of the 
CLS critique.90 
Such assessments are arguably based upon a misunderstanding of the 
radical indeterminacy critique to begin with.91 The indeterminacy critique 
is often misunderstood as a caricature of appellate adjudication in which 
judges are represented as routinely making choices from amongst a range 
of possible outcomes that the inherent indeterminacy of myriad legal 
tools—rules, standards, factors, presumptions, guidelines, principles, 
etc.—fail to foreclose. The CLS standpoint was not, for the most part, 
that law is in fact radically indeterminate and that judges act politically in 
the sense that they decide individual cases based largely upon their 
political leanings or affiliations. Rather, the argument that can be traced 
as far back as the Realists has been that the law is logically indeterminate 
while being in fact quite determinate.92 While legal rules, precedents and 
statutes may be given different interpretations, in reality they are often 
interpreted in consistent ways with the result that the law changes very 
slowly.  
The observation that the legal system is highly stable is, of course, 
correct, but it is a mistake to believe that this is because the law is 
determinate. The stability of the law derives not from any feature of the 
law itself, but from the overwhelming uniformity of ideological 
background among those empowered to make legal decisions.93  
This includes not only the judges, but the elites of the legal profession 
taught at the top law schools.94 
  
 90. See Neil MacCormick, Reconstruction After Deconstruction: A Response to 
CLS, 10 O.J.L.S. 539, 556 (1990). 
 91. See Robert Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 124-25 
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(1995). 
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This strain of argument, common to CLS, critical feminism, critical 
race theory and postcolonial studies, is much more forceful for it asserts 
that the content of law is contingent upon the institutional mechanisms 
and practices that assign meanings to legal rules, but this is done in a 
structurally political manner rather than in a superficially political way. 
The reality is that the law in most Western democracies is much more 
determinate, but the consolidation of agreement on the core meanings of 
rules is achieved not through any inherent capacity of promulgated legal 
directives to constrain judicial choice, but instead through legal practices 
that allow change only incrementally and at the margins.95 All legal 
directives, as processed through the legal system, thus exhibit a 
substantive or an ideological tilt towards certain policies and social goals 
at the expense of other equally, more, or less plausible and desirable 
values. All legal directives, as processed through the legal system, thus 
exhibit a substantive or an ideological tilt towards certain policies and 
social goals at the expense of other equally, more, or less plausible and 
desirable values.96 The lack of indeterminacy, in reality then, only adds 
to the frustration of those who perceive the ideological tilt of laws being 
masked by claims that no meaningful choice was available at any stage 
of the legal process, beyond the overtly political process of legislation. 
Thus, the lasting legacy and value of the CLS critique, building on the 
earlier work of the Realists, is that it has made it increasingly difficult to 
maintain hard and fast distinctions between law and politics (qua 
ideology), between means and ends, and between the form and substance 
of law.97 
III. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE RULE OF LAW AND ITS POLITICS 
As is evident in the CLS critique of formal legality, there are two 
political contexts in which the debates over the meaning and value of the 
Rule of Law have largely been waged: the role of the judges in the 
constitutional-political system and the structures and powers of the 
  
 95. See Hasnas, supra note 93, at 215. 
 96. See Wythe Holt, Tilt, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 280, 281-82 (1984). 
 97. See generally Raymond A. Belliotti, The Rule of Law and the Critical Legal 
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474 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 24.2 
 
welfare state. Abstract theoretical argumentation over the Rule of Law 
often begins with unarticulated understandings of specific desired 
outcomes in these contexts and ends up circuitously and surreptitiously 
justifying them. De-contextualized theories of the Rule of Law thus 
become covert arguments for certain constitutional and political 
positions—concerning issues such as the role of the judiciary and the 
structures of the administrative state—that claim neutrality but are 
essentially prejudiced towards the very conclusions that are derived from 
such supposedly neutral accounts.98 In addition to these state-centric 
contexts, there is arguably another significant context to Rule of Law 
contestations. It is the one which is most easily elided as the vast, 
complex, often deeply polarized, and thoroughly politicized context of 
the society within which various understandings of the Rule of Law take 
shape and which they are designed to sustain or reconfigure. While the 
social context is equally significant to the liberal-democratic 
understandings of the Rule of Law in Western jurisdictions, it becomes 
acutely critical when such conceptions of Rule of Law are universalized 
and projected to the vastly different social environments in the Global 
South.  
The following section of the Paper will attempt to reconstruct the 
diverse debates on the meanings and value of the Rule of Law as 
extensions of particular commitments over governance structures and 
across social planes. It is hoped that the resulting concretization of the 
various conceptions of the Rule of Law will enable a deeper 
understanding of its nature and potential value. 
A. Rule of Law and Democracy: The Rule of Common Law or the 
Rule of Legislation? 
It is rather easy to see how Rule of Law contestations, particularly the 
formal versus substantive debates, are shaped by underlying 
constitutional struggles with regard to the role of the judges. 
Proceduralist theory frequently betrays a concern with judicial powers 
  
 98. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in 
Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1997). 
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and seeks to counter expansive judicial review by adopting a legislative 
paradigm of legality demanding a greater focus on rule-following.99 This 
usually implicates a certain brand of democratic theory (democratic legal 
positivism), which sees the ascendancy of the legislature as the essence 
of democracy and finds rights-based judicial review to be troubling to the 
extent it undermines majoritarian decision-making.100 Formal legality 
thus becomes a prescription for restrained adjudication in accordance 
with rules laid down by the legislature and a demand that the judges cede 
the determination of value judgments to democratic institutions. 
Judiciaries are, after all, notoriously undemocratic, if not necessarily 
anti-democratic. Entrusting them with decisions on socio-political values 
and economic policies risks the creation of a situation wherein power is 
exercised in the absence of requisite competence and/or democratic 
control.101 In this mode of analysis, Rule of Law is the rule of rules, and 
formal Rule of Law theory equates with “rulism.”102  
But is rulism or formalism of this kind even possible? Have we not 
come to accept that a certain degree of indeterminacy inheres in rules 
and, as a result, in adjudication? As Schauer illuminatingly explains, a 
certain kind of formalism qua rulism is plausible.103 He distinguishes 
between two kinds of formalism.104 The negative kind involves the denial 
of choice by the judges, for example, in cases such as Lochner v. New 
York where they claim that they are merely applying established neutral 
principles.105 Such decisions justifiably earn formalism a bad name. In 
contrast, a positive kind of formalism is possible, which involves the 
denial of choice to the judges.106 Following Hart, Schauer argues that 
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 100. See Tom Campbell, Blaming Legal Positivism: A Reply to David Dyzenhaus, 
28 AUSTL. J. LEG. PHIL. 31, 34 (2003). Waldron notes that while legal positivism is 
philosophically oriented towards the centrality of legislation, positivists have veered 
away from that position and have increasingly become court-centric. See JEREMY 
WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 15-16 (1999). 
 101. See Campbell, supra note 100, at 37. 
 102. See Schauer, supra note 85, at 535. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 511-19. 
 105. Id. at 511-14. 
 106. Id. at 520. 
476 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 24.2 
 
more often than not indeterminacy exists only at the margins, or the 
penumbra of meanings of rules.107 Therefore, it is possible for a judge to 
stay within the core meanings of applicable rules and leave the 
explication of the penumbra to other, more democratic, decision-makers. 
Even if rulism of the kind that he describes is possible, there is yet the 
normative question of its desirability. For Schauer, formalism qua rulism 
has the advantages of stability and predictability.108 Furthermore, it 
restrains the arbitrary exercise of power (by the judges), which is good 
“for those who have jurisdiction to improve on yesterday also have 
jurisdiction to make things worse.”109 
Two questions, and fairly big ones, remain however. First, if rulism 
and restraint of judicial decision-making exist in a social terrain of 
inequality then is it desirable to advocate stability and conservatism of 
the kind that he demands? What if a segment of the people demand a 
kind of Rule of Law that expects judges to make things more equitable 
than they historically were? As even Schauer concedes, these questions 
have precedence. Formalism has value only “when it is thought desirable 
to narrow the decisional opportunities and the decisional range of a 
[particular] class of decisionmakers. . . . Judgments about when to 
employ formalism are contextual and not inexorable, political and not 
logical, psychological and economic rather than conceptual.”110  
Second, do legal systems of the kind that he describes exist in fact? 
Note that a formalist legal system has to be a “closed” one in which the 
judges have neither the discretion to refuse to apply a clear rule on the 
basis that it would not serve the rule’s purpose nor the capacity to modify 
the existing rule or create a new one.111 Such a description fails in the 
face of the lived reality of Common Law systems the world over 
wherein, to varying degrees, judges do appear to have the power to adopt 
a purposive approach towards the application of rules as well as the 
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capacity to modify the rules in the process of their instantiation.112 There 
are strong arguments to be made for the proposition, which may only be 
empirically verified, that many ordinary people living in societies with 
Common Law legal systems consider the exercise of such purposive and 
context-oriented decisional jurisdiction to be the legitimate function of 
the courts. Common Law adjudication and rule-making have 
considerable democratic legitimacy then in the sense that the modes of 
reasoning employed in Common Law and its institutional practices are 
backed by widespread acceptance. Common Law adjudication can also 
be democracy-fostering in another way: by investigating the underlying 
policy rationales and purposes of legislative and executive action the 
courts can force the rulers to make their premises and goals explicit.113 It 
is largely on the foundations of the perceived legitimacy of the Common 
Law, particularly where the courts have gained enhanced capacity to 
engage in rights-based decision-making, that substantive Rule of Law 
theory has built its edifice.  
The arguments supporting the proto-democratic legitimacy of 
Common Law adjudication may, however, be pushed to the point where 
they begin to sound like claims of the necessary and inherent value of 
Common Law methodology, and even of its superiority vis a vis 
democratic institutions.114 Such arguments are frequently rooted in a 
distrust of the democratic processes and betray a concern with elite or 
interest-group capture of lawmaking institutions.115 In such a political 
calculus the courts appear as the only institution capable of countering 
the excesses of the political executive and the legislature. This, however, 
raises the spectre of a counter-majoritarian difficulty, and in Western 
liberal democracies the justification for judicial review processes which 
over-ride legislation or policymaking by elected executives must be 
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found in democracy itself.116 Such exaggerated claims concerning the 
nature of the Common Law are liable to be challenged with considerable 
success.117  
It must also be stressed that not only the Rule of Law but democracy 
too is a contingent concept; a means to ends rather than an absolute end 
in itself.118 Further, democracy is a relative concept and an ideal: at any 
given time in a society there may be more or less of it; some institutions 
may be more democratic and others less; and some institutions may be 
more responsive to certain segments of the population and certain kinds 
of demands while others may be attuned to audiences and demands of a 
different kind.119 It is, therefore, problematic to issue categorical 
pronouncements of the kind that equate democracy exclusively with 
majoritarianism and the ascendancy of the representative institutions.120 
It may even be legitimate to see democracy as a vision of communicative 
discourse in which not only the legislatures but also the courts, the 
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bureaucracy, the political parties, the civil society, the media, interest 
groups and various social organizations are participants.121 
It is in this light that we must see the relative success in recent times 
of substantive Rule of Law theory, which relies upon the veneration of 
the Common Law. The advances in Common Law jurisprudence 
concerning the judicial review of legislative and executive action have 
been largely welcomed in political environments where politicians and 
politics have come to be mistrusted as being susceptible to special 
interests, and/or where the administrative state has been perceived to be 
the new Leviathan unaccountable to the electorate and their 
representatives. Common Law constitutionalism and rights-based 
judicial review are increasingly seen as the bulwark of liberties and the 
essence of the Rule of Law. This does not mean that the Common Law 
paradigm of Rule of Law is invariably the reform-oriented version. 
Historically, in fact, the relationship between Common Law and laissez 
faire liberalism formed the “dark side” of the Rule of Law.122 Such a 
dramatic turnaround in such a short time, from the beginning to the end 
of the 20th Century, in the constitutional position and the public 
perception of the Common Law’s institutions and practices highlights, 
again, the contextual contingency of the legitimacy of judicial role and of 
the various conceptions of the Rule of Law that are built around it. 
B. Rule of Law and the Administrative/Regulatory State: Rule of 
Administrative Law? 
Another political context which has shaped the debates over the Rule 
of Law is that of the modern administrative state and the challenges it 
poses for the democratic legitimacy of the state and its law. The growth 
of much of Rule of Law theory appears to have occurred in the shadow 
of the welfare state—in opposition to it (e.g., Hayek and, arguably, 
Dicey) or in justification or demand for it (e.g., Unger and the CLS).123 A 
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theory of the Rule of Law is thus, in vital measure, a theory of the role of 
law in a particular administrative state.124 However, despite such historic 
relevance, the bulk of Rule of Law theory has lost its grounding in an 
accurate conceptualization of the challenges of the administrative-
regulatory state and is impoverished on that account. 
For Hayek, the primary virtue of formal legality was that it rendered 
government by decree untenable. The value of governance through clear, 
general, publicly promulgated, and stable rules was that it constrained 
discretionary exercise of powers.125 The decision-makers whose 
discretion Hayek thus sought to constrain through formal legality were 
not so much the appellate judges who have found themselves at the 
centre of most of recent contestations over the meanings of the Rule of 
Law but rather executive officials.126 For Hayek, the looming welfare 
state that heralded a transformation in the bureaucracy was a disaster in 
the making.127 The pedantry of the stereotypical bureaucrat was a virtue 
for him and the prospects of these same officials exercising vast 
discretionary powers in post-war administrative states in liberal Western 
democracies was a change for the worse.128 The concern, however, was 
not limited to the exercise of these discretionary powers arbitrarily but 
also encompassed a broader libertarian anxiety with the expansion of 
governmental apparatuses that would unduly interfere with the 
historically vast domains of private autonomy.129  
For Unger and other critical scholars, the rise of the welfare-oriented 
state was an inevitable development. The welfare state would necessarily 
be one characterized by expanding state regulation of socio-economic 
spheres and the erosion of the traditional boundaries between public and 
private domains. For Unger, the emergent welfare state in “postliberal” 
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societies demonstrated the inherent tension between formal equality and 
substantive justice as well as undermined procedural legality.130 As 
governments in these societies have progressively intervened in areas 
previously left to private ordering, they have had to deal with entrenched 
inequalities resulting in a move away from formal equality towards 
substantive justice.131 This shift has resulted in a “turn from formalistic to 
purposive or policy-oriented styles of legal reasoning,” stripping “the 
state of every pretence to impartiality” and leaving a discredited 
conception of formal legality in its wake.132 He predicted that legislation 
would become increasingly open-textured vesting significant discretion 
in administrative agencies and the courts so that such legislation could be 
implemented and interpreted with regard to the particularities of 
individual cases.133 As a result, legal reasoning would become purposive 
rather than formalistic, and formal Rule of Law notions would become 
progressively irrelevant.134  
The welfare state came (in many places in the Global North). 
Generalist bureaucrats transformed into policy specialists and expert 
administrators. Rule-bound bureaucracies spawned specialized, 
independent agencies and public corporations with impressive arrays of 
rule-making, enforcement and adjudicatory powers. Overburdened 
legislatures increasingly lost the capacity to specify jurisdictional limits 
and meaningful guidelines in the governing statutes that might constrain 
the broad governmental powers entrusted to the new administrative 
agencies and corporations. The elected higher executive progressively 
lost the capacity to effectively supervise the operations of the traditional 
departments as well as agencies and corporations. In the context of this 
modern administrative state—due in part to the dramatic expansion of 
discretionary powers, commingling of function, deep pockets of 
democratic deficit, and lack of political accountability—the rhetorical 
pull of Rule of Law ideal has increased rather than having been 
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diminished.135 Older ideological and philosophical contestations have to 
be reshaped in this evolving context. Liberalism itself has faced a split 
between its neo-classical libertarian strain and the more recent social 
liberalism camp.136 
Neo-classical liberalism has sought the remedy for the perceived 
excesses of the welfare state in a move towards the creation of the 
“regulatory state”: “a shift in the style of governance away from the 
direct provision of public services, associated with the welfare state, and 
towards oversight of provision of public services by others.”137 The 
failures or weaknesses attributable to the “total control” models of the 
welfare state, which the regulatory state paradigm is designed to obviate, 
include “the limited capacity of central-state institutions to know what is 
best provided by state intervention . . . [and] the risk that state actors will 
be diverted from pursuit of public interest outcomes to the exercise of 
public power for the pursuit of narrower private interests.”138 The 
remedies built into the regulatory state model are the privatization of a 
vast array of operations and the creation of apex regulatory institutions 
mandated to regulate these privatized functions.139 New regulatory 
methods are thus emerging which involve a reliance on regulator-
stakeholder networks that develop flexible, negotiated, and cooperative 
arrangements to provide regulatory outcomes.140 With a net decrease in 
governmental powers due to privatization, the place of the Rule of Law 
in this framework is necessarily limited to procedural legality and 
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minimalist ultra vires review. Rule of Law thus becomes a demand for 
less judicial power that ties in neatly with the reduction in executive 
power at the heart of the regulatory state. 
However, the regulatory state, the privatization and fragmentation of 
governmental functions, has in turn created new problems of 
accountability.141 These problems are addressed through a reliance on 
market forces, consumer-citizen action, the construction of dense and 
complicated webs of accountability-inducing procedural mechanisms—
such as quasi-legislative notice and hearing requirements for rule-
making, transparency, and disclosure obligations142—and institutions 
such as ombudsmen and specialized tribunals.143 However, the spectre of 
special interest dominance and capture of regulatory processes by 
powerful private interests continuously haunts the regulatory state and its 
public-private partnership arrangements. “As important decisions are 
shifted to informal processes involving nongovernmental actors, how is 
the law to prevent factional abuse of power, curb the tyranny of 
expertise, and ensure public-regarding outcomes, including distributional 
equity?”144  
Unlike neo-classical liberalism, social liberalism has come to accept 
the welfare state and the need for some state interference in the private 
domain to counter deeply-entrenched inequalities. The problem for social 
liberalism then is how to reconcile “both the rule of law and a 
reconstructed, more emancipatory welfare state.”145 For social liberalism, 
the continued failures of accountability in the regulatory state demand 
the regulation of the regulators. Traditional judicial review of executive 
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action, the policing of jurisdictional boundaries and legislative mandates, 
and the insistence upon fair decision-making procedures by the courts 
have emerged in recent decades as the central accountability mechanisms 
and as the “last resort” that gives bite to the entire network of formal and 
informal accountability networks.146 For social liberalism ultra vires 
review and procedural legality have thus acquired a new relevance in the 
regulatory state. However, since the aspirations of social liberalism are 
not confined to the control of governmental power in order to ensure the 
maximum possible autonomy of private action, as in neo-classical 
liberalism, something more than formal legality and traditional judicial 
review is needed. Since the aspirations of social liberalism include some 
measure of substantive equality, then a conception of the Rule of Law 
rooted in such ideological terrain is in deep tension with the regulatory 
state. Such a conception demands that the state should interfere to some 
extent in the private ordering to counter embedded inequalities. This is 
the “[tragic] ‘paradox of politics’” faced by social liberalism and its 
engagement with the Rule of Law.147  
While the fears of social liberalism are catered for by formal legality 
and traditional judicial review, its hopes and aspirations call out for a 
new kind of administrative law that not only constrains the arbitrary 
exercise of powers but also “ensures that regulatory agencies exercise 
their policymaking discretion in a manner that is reasoned and responsive 
to the wide range of social and economic interests affected by their 
decisions.”148 This kind of administrative law is much more intrusive and 
substantive as compared to the traditional ultra vires model of 
administrative law rooted in formal legality. Such administrative law is 
amenable to judicial review of executive action based on rights, on 
legitimate expectations, and maybe even occasional review of executive 
policy based upon the requirement of proportionality. Neo-classical 
liberalism may know where to draw the line but social liberalism 
certainly fails to make a coherent case for a meaningful distinction 
between formal and substantive Rule of Law, between administrative law 
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and the judicialization of administrative policy. The administrative-
regulatory state, and the phenomena associated with the corresponding 
significance of the judicial review of administrative action, thus provides 
the terrain upon which Rule of Law contestations have to be increasingly 
resolved. The continuing rhetorical pull of the Rule of Law ideal and the 
expanding role of the courts in the review of the actions of the regulatory 
state (or the regulation of the regulators), demands a reconciliation. This 
requires a re-conceptualization of Rule of Law in such a fashion that the 
traditional boundaries between law, politics, policy and rights are 
meaningfully redrawn, and re-contextualized. 
C. Rule of Law in the Global South: Rule of Law-and-
Development? 
In addition to the contexts of state structures, Rule of Law theorists 
are also becoming increasingly mindful of the social context, at least to 
the extent of acknowledging that an important prerequisite for the 
implantation of Rule of Law is that law possesses significant traction as a 
matter of social fact.149 However, even such mindfulness of the relevance 
of the sociological dimensions has not opened up many to the bigger, 
more significant and much more interesting questions about the relation 
between (rule of) law and society. The most important issue is not 
whether a particular society is ripe for the implantation of the Rule of 
Law. That issue can never be meaningfully addressed unless we answer 
the prior and more significant questions: what conceptions of the Rule of 
Law has that society germinated? Why have some conceptions been 
more successful? Whether the dominant ideas about the Rule of Law are 
also the most legitimate? The problem with conceptualizing the Rule of 
Law apart from the political, economic, and cultural contexts is that it 
obscures these vital questions.  
One of the great ironies, and a tragic one at that, of the 
universalization of the Rule of Law is that the dominant formal and 
substantive versions have come to dominate the discourse even in the 
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Global South where the political, constitutional, economic, and social 
contexts are fundamentally different from those in the North where most 
of the speculation over the meaning and relevance of abstract-universal 
Rule of Law theory has historically been situated. In much of the Global 
South constitutionalism is weak and democracy is thin or procedural.150 
And yet, the usage of law to further coercive state power is pervasive.151 
While a core concern of formal Rule of Law theory, the prevention of 
arbitrary exercise of power, is especially relevant, formal legality is 
distinctly unable to perform a useful function in this respect. At the same 
time the bureaucratic-administrative state has failed to transform in many 
places in the Global South into a welfare state,152 and some of the core 
concerns of critical scholars (that formal legality inhibits the 
development of a welfare-oriented state) is also simultaneously relevant. 
A powerful state is understandably feared for it is dominated by the 
elites, but it is at the same time acknowledged that only the state can 
command the sort of power and resources that are arguably necessary to 
resolve entrenched problems of social and economic inequality. The 
concern for democracy is not that of the tyranny of the majority but often 
that of the tyranny of the minority. Even judges have historically been 
part of the elites,153 and where occasionally they have stood up to the 
state, the masses have looked on with simultaneous amazement and 
indifference at internecine conflicts (presumably of interest) amongst the 
entrenched classes.  
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If the dominant conceptions of formal and substantive (liberal rights-
oriented) legality are rooted in the political and socio-economic contexts 
of Western democracies, are these suitable models for postcolonial states 
and transitional democracies of the Global South? Yet, these are the 
versions of the Rule of Law that the international development and donor 
agencies have purveyed as the elixir to the ills of under-development and 
have crammed down the throats of recalcitrant states.154 The impetus to 
define the Rule of Law in relatively thin terms of formal legality or basic 
rights even in the radically different contexts of the Global South is 
evident, for these are the only versions that can be marketed in 
standardized packages. The inadequacy of the dominant conceptions is 
also particularly obvious here: the failure to counter the worst excesses, 
the refusal to challenge the status quo, and the silence on matters that are 
most relevant to those who need protection. There is another clear 
ideological tilt as well, as not only formal legality but property-oriented 
individual rights regimes inherently favor a certain brand of capitalism 
suitable to multinational corporations and significant players in the 
global trade.155  
In response, the critics of the elitist and liberal-capitalist economic 
agenda at the heart of global trade are increasingly standing their ground 
and re-appropriating the Rule of Law against these old and new forms of 
hegemony. Such reconceptualization of the Rule of Law is proceeding in 
three related dimensions. Firstly, participants of the Rule of Law 
enterprises are being asked to fully appreciate its “new discursivity” 
which “reveals that the rule of law . . . means different things to different 
peoples, in ways that render any general theory about it 
inchoate/impossible. Its histories differ not just across legal and social 
cultures but also within same-law regions. Its prescriptive bases also 
remain contested sites.”156 There are thus many conceptions of the Rule 
of Law, the role of law, and its institutions in any given society. Any de-
contextualized theory of the Rule of Law which obscures its 
contestedness in a society and refuses to acknowledge who it privileges, 
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and who it disadvantages, will not be neutral or de-politicized merely on 
account of such oblivion or denial.  
Secondly, there is the demand to articulate visions of the Rule of Law 
that are tied in with concrete questions of constitutional politics. Western 
accounts of the Rule of Law, rooted in European history, further 
constitutional doctrines that leave the most important questions regarding 
constitutionalism, governance structures and the constraint of arbitrary 
exercise of governmental powers unaddressed:  
Does the rule of law . . . privilege ‘good’ and ethically viable ways of 
structuring representation? . . . Does it favour federalism over unitary, 
republican over monarchical, secular over theological, flexible over 
rigid constitutional formats? Does it privilege plenary judicial review 
over forms of legislative, executive and administrative action? . . . How 
may hierarchies of administration of justice devised, justices appointed 
and their autonomy and accountability be concretely defined? In what 
ways may the rule of law prescribe the structuration of legislative 
power: should this be accompanied by an integral ethical minimum, 
such that there may be said to exist critical ethical thresholds to 
‘parliamentary sovereignty’?157  
Without meaningful attempts to answer these and similar questions, Rule 
of Law theory is mere conceptual play that has little relevance even to 
the minimal concerns of the constraint of governmental powers and 
liberty subject to law. Worse still, plagiarizing universalist abstract 
answers to some of these questions from the North—such as the 
uncritical adoption of separation of powers—may become an obstacle to 
the quest for socio-economic justice that is increasingly at the heart of 
the Rule of Law in the Global South.158 
Thirdly, the reconceptualization of the Rule of Law is taking place in 
tandem with the reorientation of democracy. Wherever formal 
democracy exists in the Global South, it is riven with elite control of 
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politics and hence deep democratic deficits.159 In response, there are 
myriad localized forms of resistance often involving understandings and 
interpretations of the Rule of Law that diverge from its ideation by the 
elite-state complex.160 The Rule of Law is valued as a mode of 
challenging socio-economic and political inequality and legal institutions 
are only relevant as “a terrain of struggle of the multitudes against the 
rule of the miniscule.”161 In such understandings, elected legislatures are 
not necessarily democratic and do not necessarily deserve the deference 
that dominant Rule of Law theory traditionally accords them. 
Occasionally it is a good thing, dependent always on specific outcomes, 
that courts refuse to acknowledge the supremacy of the legislatures in the 
name of rights protection.  
In opposition to abstract theorization, a call is thus being made to 
envision the Rule of Law with the explicit ideological agenda of 
challenging deep-rooted inequalities in both the public and private 
domains, which includes positive obligations of the state to make law for 
the disadvantaged, deprived and the disempowered.162 Given the 
anxieties generated by the old and de-contextualized accounts, nominally 
neutral but usually highly supportive of the status quo, reconstructed 
Rule of Law discourses in the Global South must be deeply 
contextualized and politicized. Rule of Law must be mindful of historical 
inequalities and simultaneously imbued with visions of more egalitarian 
futures. It must become the site of the most significant contestations over 
the structure of the legal system and of the value of law in redressing 
inequalities. To the extent that such situated and essentially contested 
accounts of the Rule of Law may lead to comparative insights, the South 
has much to learn from the South to the extent that contexts and the 
historical experiences with law are similar. In fact, the South has much to 
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teach to the Global North as well. What the slow, glacier-like pace of 
legal change in the North masks—i.e., the inherent contingency of law, 
its institutions and processes—the fluidity and the contestability of legal 
transformation in the South lay bare.  
A CONCLUSION ON THE POLITICIZATION OF LAW AND ITS RULE 
There is an increasing, if not widespread, acknowledgement of the 
essentially political nature of Rule of Law in the sense that the 
contestations over the meaning and relevance of the Rule of Law are 
essentially debates about the configuration of constitutional 
arrangements, state structures and complex state-society dynamics. As 
such, the politics of the Rule of Law are fully imbricated in the politics 
of law.163 However, while law is no longer seen as a self-regulating, 
insulated or autopoietic system, there is at the same time recognition of 
the fact that the politics of the law (and of the Rule of Law) is a very 
specific form of institutionalized politics which operates within 
parameters accepted by at least a majority of the legal complex, and 
often even the public. Legal politics can be differentiated from other 
forms of politics in that “principles of coherence or consistency are more 
pronounced within law”164 and it is characterized by a certain degree of 
inertia, incremental development, reasoned resolution, and either-or 
outcomes, amongst other characteristics—legal justice as opposed to 
both the compromise of electoral politics and the policy-driven discretion 
of administration.165 Other characteristics of the politics of law include 
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 164. Alan C. Hunt, Law’s Empire or Legal Imperialism? in READING DWORKIN 
CRITICALLY 9, 41 (Alan Hunt ed., 1991). 
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the special and institutionalized forms of practical reasoning reflected, 
for example, in the principles of statutory interpretation; adversarial, 
inquisitorial or mixed litigation processes; burdens and standards of 
proof; the methods of Common Law, Civil Law or hybrid legal systems; 
varying degrees of adherence to precedents; the special nature of legal 
remedies, etc. All of these, collectively, the technology of law or the 
modes of doing law, are contingent in the sense that these could be 
different and are subject to change. All of these are also political in the 
sense that they are not ends in themselves but rather serve ends and 
policies external to them and the legitimacy of which ends is always 
open to contestation.  
The politicization of law has politicized the Rule of Law to its core. 
Yet, the Rule of Law has emerged virtually unscathed, and by some 
accounts has attained an even more significant position in the catalogue 
of political ideals on account of (not despite) its’ very politicization. The 
Marxists appear to have increasingly adopted the Rule of Law as a 
legitimate political philosophy.166 Even Unger has reconsidered his 
position.167 In the Global South the Rule of Law has begun to achieve the 
status of an over-arching political ideal that not only incorporates, but 
gives relevance and meaning to other political ideals including 
democracy, constitutionalism, and rights. How can we explain the 
supposedly ironic situation that the philosophical contestations over the 
meaning of the Rule of Law, its inherent or contingent value, its 
underlying ideology and political nature, have all reached stalemates and 
yet the resonance of the Rule of Law has only increased? If we were to 
encapsulate the equilibrium reached in the philosophical debates charted 
earlier it would, roughly, be along these lines. The Rule of Law has a 
formal core, which has value only to the extent that it enhances the 
efficiency of law in achieving those socio-politico-economic ends that 
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may be ascribed to law. The ultimate value of the Rule of Law, however, 
is contingent on those very substantive ends that are external to formal 
legality. The value of formal or procedural legality, as the inner 
principles of the efficiency of law, and of the technology of law 
generally, is contingent on how well the law serves those socio-political 
ends. The Rule of Law then becomes a theory of justice according to 
law; a normative theory of the proper place of law in society and polity; a 
theory about the aims the law can effectively serve and the manner in 
which the technology of law may legitimately further collective social 
and political goals. It is also a normative account of legal change, for the 
technology of law is also subject to modification in accordance with the 
demands placed upon it. 
Therefore, what we may discern from a myriad of situated, 
contextualized and contested—and in that sense politicized—accounts of 
the Rule of Law is that the following big questions cannot be answered 
in the abstract: How to draw the distinctions between formal and 
substantive Rule of Law? How to meaningfully discern the boundaries 
between law and politics, and law and policy? How to allocate 
governmental powers amongst state institutions? How to determine the 
legitimate bounds of judicial review? Every thin theory of the Rule of 
Law is embedded in a thick theory; every thick theory is in turn 
contingent upon theories of constitutionalism, of state structure, of 
democracy, and of justice, whether articulated or not. A theory of the 
Rule of Law is thus, in its broadest and most meaningful sense, an 
account of the place of law in society, in polity, in history; it is a socio-
politico-economic account of what the technology of law is good for in a 
given state and society. It is a theory of the authority of legal institutions 
and the legitimacy of law. Thus, an explanation for the perpetual rise in 
the prominence of the Rule of Law as a political ideal and its increasing 
relevance in political rhetoric and practice has to be found in altogether 
different dimensions: that of the social-political-economic contexts.168 A 
theory of the Rule of Law must accord with its social and political 
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context. It must conform to the aspirations of those to whom it is 
addressed—not only its specific clientele within the legal complex but 
its’ supposed beneficiaries in the society. Only then will it achieve 
theoretical soundness and also command fidelity.  
The resonance of the Rule of Law in Pakistan, as in any other place, 
can be explained only in light of its’ constitutional politics, state 
structure, and social orderings. It is not possible to evaluate the theory of 
Rule of Law that the superior courts of Pakistan have espoused in their 
recent jurisprudence except within the historical contexts of Pakistan’s 
constitutional development, the transformation in its state structures, the 
evolution of its socio-cultural environments, and the distribution of its 
economic resources. It is only in the lived reality of the law in Pakistan’s 
evolving state-society dialectics that the Supreme Court, and those 
seeking to critique its jurisprudence, might find meaningful ways to 
engage with the inherent politics of the Rule of Law. 
 
 
